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Abstract
This paper considers a delegated common agent who produces a public good with private
information regarding his cost. We show that truthful strategies are not optimal for principals,
and that the agent enjoys some rent in equilibrium. It is not always that all principals make
contributions: the number of contracts with positive contributions accepted by the agent in
equilibrium is non−increasing as the agent becomes less efficient.
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In the standard voluntary provision of public good models, the allocations are usually
ine±cient in a Nash equilibrium because of the free-rider problem. However, the
result has to be reconsidered when there is a common agent who produces the
public good. The di®erence from the standard voluntary contribution games lies in
that the contributions are contingent upon the equilibrium outcomes. Bagnoli &
Lipman (1989, 92) consider a special common agency game where the public good is
provided in indivisible units and conclude that a subset of Nash equilibria, referred
to as undominated perfect equilibria, are always e±cient. In a general situation
where information is complete, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that truthful
equilibria can always induce e±cient outcomes.
This paper considers a delegated common agent who has private information
regarding his cost in producing a public good. In particular, the agent can contract
with any subset of principals. In most of the literature that deals with asymmetric
information, only \intrinsic common agency," where the agent must either accept
or reject all contracts, has been considered.1 A notable exception is Laussel and Le
Breton (1998), who analyze the same problem as in this paper but with a crucial
di®erence: the agent considers the ex ante participation constraints, that is, he
signs the contracts before realizing his type. In a so-called truthful equilibrium, the
expected payo® for the agent is zero, and free-riding is never an optimal choice for
the contributors. Hence, e±cient outcomes are implemented and all contracts are
accepted, so that the results in Bernheim and Whinstein (1986) are still valid.
It is quite di®erent if the agent learns his type before signing the contracts, i.e.
with ex post participation constraints. It is no longer optimal for the principals to
use truthful strategies so that the equilibrium output is not at the e±cient level.
Moreover, it is possible that the agent will only contract with a subset of principals
in equilibrium. Hence, the results in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Laussel
and Le Breton (1998) fail to hold. Indeed, we show that players jointly prefer the
output to be as large as possible. Since every principal who contributes extracts the
information rent from the agent, this part of reduction in output is larger when the
less e±cient types of the agent accept more contracts. It follows that the less e±cient
types would like to turn down some undesirable contracts when the reduction in
output is too serious. If this is the case, it is optimal for some principals to be free
riders because they can enjoy a larger output and pay less. This results in that the
number of principals who contribute and whose proposals are accepted by the agent
is non-increasing as the agent becomes less e±cient. This is obviously di®erent from
the previous literature, where all contracts are accepted in a truthful equilibrium.
1For example, see Martimort (1992, 1996a, b) and Stole (1991).
12 The Model
There are n consumers (principals) of a global public good. We denote the set of all
principals by N. Each principal o®ers a procurement contract to a common agent
who produces the public good. The game proceeds as follows. First, nature draws µ,
the cost parameter of the agent. In the second stage, the principals simultaneously
o®er their (nonlinear) contribution schedules, Ti(g), which are contingent upon the
¯nal output g.2 In the ¯nal stage, the agent decides which proposals to accept.
If the agent rejects all of them, everyone gets 0 and the game ends, otherwise he
chooses the optimal output to maximize his pro¯t and all payo®s are realized.
Principal i has a quasi-linear utility function, Vi(g)¡Ti, i 2 N. We assume that
Vi(g) is concave in g, Vi(0) = 0, and limg!1 V 0
i (g) = 0. The total cost of production
for the agent is µc(g), where c0(g) > 0;c00(g) > 0, and µ 2 £ = [µ
¹
; ¹ µ]. µ is private
information to the agent, and it is common knowledge that µ has a distribution
function F(µ) on [µ
¹




f(µ)) > 0 for all µ. Given the set of contribution schedules fTign
i=1, the
pro¯t of the agent is ¦(A;µ) =
P
j2A Tj ¡ µc(g), where A is the set of principals
who contribute and whose proposals are accepted by the agent. We also assume
that 9 g > 0 :
Pn
j=1 Vj(g) ¡ [¹ µ + N ¢
F(µ)
f(µ)]c(g) > 0, which means that there exists a
positive social surplus to provide the public good for all types. Lastly, we restrict
the analysis to equilibria for which g(¢) are continuous.
3 Nash Equilibrium
We denote a Nash equilibrium by (fTign
i=1;A;gA). In the last stage, given fTign
i=1,
the agent chooses the optimal output g and the set A, such that gA(µ) 2 argmax~ g £P
j2A Tj(~ g) ¡ µc(~ g)
¤




3.1 The Benchmark Case: Complete Information
When information is complete, given fTjgj6=i, it is a standard result that Principal
i's optimal Ti, if he contributes, satis¯es T 0
i(gA(µ)) = V 0
i (gA(µ)). That is, Ti is locally
truthful.
There exist equilibria where some principals do not contribute and become free
riders so that the equilibrium outputs are ine±cient. However, if we focus on (glob-
ally) truthful equilibria, the e±cient allocations are always implemented in equilib-
rium. The reason for this is as follows. When principals use truthful strategies,
2With quasi-linear objective functions, the Taxation Principle allows us to consider simple
nonlinear contribution schedules without loss of generality. See Martimort and Stole (2003).
3To consider the out-of-equilibrium behavior, Ti(g) has to be appropriately extended for out-
of-equilibrium outputs in order for the optimal solution to be always de¯ned by equation (1). See
the discussions in Martimort (1992) and Martimort and Stole (2003).
2for another Principal j, Vj(~ g
~ A) ¡ ~ Tj(~ g
~ A) = Vj(gA) ¡ Tj(gA), where ~ g
~ A is the output
when Principal i does not contribute. That is, the contribution of each principal
everywhere re°ects his true net willingness to pay with respect to the equilibrium
output. If all principals contribute and the agent accepts all contracts, the payo® of
Principal i is Vi(gA) ¡ µ
£











On the other hand, Principal i obtains Vi(~ g














~ A) is always
true because gA maximizes the social surplus, it is a best response for Principal
i to contribute. Therefore, in a truthful equilibrium, A = N. Therefore, the re-
sults in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) remain valid here. It follows that since P
i2N V 0
i (gA(µ)) = µc0(gA), which is indeed the Samuelson condition, the ¯rst-best
output is achieved for every µ.
3.2 Asymmetric Information


































8 K µ N ¡ fig and 8 µ 2 [µ
¹
; ¹ µ]:
The incentive constraint is obtained from the envelope theorem. The individual
rationality constraint means that, in equilibrium, the agent cannot be better o® by







































where jAj is the number of principals in the set A(µ). Equation (1) shows that truth-
ful strategies are no longer optimal for the principals. Moreover, there is a positive







This is also di®erent from the result under complete information.
We can show our ¯rst result:
4This is so because the agent's pro¯t is always 0 in equilibrium and Tk = 0 if k 2 N ¡ ~ A.
5To ensure that there exists a Nash equilibrium, we assume that
P
j2A Tj is su±ciently concave
and twice di®erentiable.








































Proof. Suppose not. Principal i may o®er ~ Ti (in which output ~ g




























































. That is, there exists a
pro¯table deviation for Principal i, which contradicts the fact that the fTig are
equilibrium schedules.
This generalizes the result in Laussel and Le Breton (1998), where each principal
o®ers a contribution schedule such that the output maximizes the sum of her ex-
pected utility and the expected pro¯t of the agent. Contrary to them, however, with
ex post participation constraints, the agent obtains a positive pro¯t in equilibrium.
The next proposition claims that, in equilibrium, players jointly prefer a set A
such that the output is maximal.
Proposition 2. In a Nash equilibrium, for any ~ A µ N, gA(µ) ¸ ~ g
~ A(µ) for any µ.
Proof. For the most ine±cient type, ¹ µ, his rent is always 0, and so the principals
can o®er fTig such that gA(¹ µ) ¸ ~ g
~ A(¹ µ), and obtain the highest utility at ¹ µ.
Suppose that the claim is not true, and there exists an ~ A(µk) such that ~ g
~ A(µk) >
gA(µk) for any µk 2 [µ0;µ00) = £², where j£²j = ²; and gA(µ) ¸ ~ g
~ A(µ) for any
µ 2 [µ00; ¹ µ]. The types µ ¸ µ0 have no incentives to deviate as long as the rent is














However, even so, there can exist a pro¯table deviation for the principals for
the following reason. Consider the following schedules that induce a higher output
^ g > gA: Principal i 2 A o®ers f~ Tig for µk, where
P
j2A ~ T 0
j(^ g) = µc0(^ g) and ~ Ti(^ g) =
Ti(^ g) + "; and the same fTig for any other µ ¸ µ00. For an arbitrarily small ², every
type µ ¸ µ0 will accept these new schedules since the agent can obtain at least the
same rent as before, because now f~ Tig is higher or at least the same as fTig.6 On the
other hand, every principal will enjoy a higher output at µk. According to equation
(1), the equilibrium schedules must make the net utility Vi ¡ Ti increase in g (since
V 0
i ¡T 0

















6To make this possible, consider a two-part tari®, fti(µ);si(µ)g, such that tig + si = Ti. To
induce the agent to produce a higher ^ g in £², the principals can let
P
j2A ~ tj = µc0(^ g), and ~ Ti(^ g) =
~ ti^ g+~ si for µk. By carefully choosing ~ si, the principals can control the rent such that it is increased














if i 62 A. Hence, for an
arbitrary ², all the principals and the agent can be better o®, which contradicts the
assumption that the fTig are equilibrium schedules. Hence, gA(µ) ¸ ~ g
~ A(µ) holds for
any µ ¸ µ0.
Since the same logic can be applied to another smaller µk having ~ g
~ A(µk) > gA(µk),
by induction, gA(µ) ¸ ~ g
~ A(µ) must be true for every µ.
This result suggests that all the principals and the agent prefer the output pro-
duced at its maximal level. In the case of the agent, his rent is higher when the
output is larger. For each principal, according to equation (1), the marginal contri-
bution is less than the marginal bene¯t due to the information rent. The equilibrium
level of the public good is thus under-provided compared to the ¯rst-best level, where
V 0
i (g) = T 0
i(g), and so the principal indeed has the incentive to expand the output.
Thus, the principals will make contributions such that the output determined in
equation (2) is the largest through the selection of A, in which case they cannot give
up more rent to produce a higher output and also bene¯t themselves.
Another important feature in a truthful Nash equilibrium with complete infor-
mation or ex ante participation is that all principals make contributions, i.e. A = N
for every type. We show in the following result that this is not always the case under
asymmetric information:
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, A(µ00) µ A(µ0) if µ00 > µ0.
Proof. First of all, the incentive constraint implies that gA(¢) is non-increasing in
£, that is, gA(µ0) ¸ gA(µ00) if and only if µ0 < µ00. Second, if i 62 A(µ0), then
Ti(gA(µ0)) = 0. We show as follows that Ti(gA(µ)) · 0 for all µ > µ0, so that
i 62 A(µ00). When Ti(gA(µ0)) = 0, Principal i obtains Vi(gA(µ0)). If we suppose
that Ti(gA(µ00)) > 0, she then obtains Vi(gA(µ00)) ¡ Ti(gA(µ00)) if i 2 A(µ00), and
Vi(~ g) if i 62 A(µ00), where ~ g 2 argmaxgK ¦(K;µ00) for all K µ N ¡ fig. From
equation (2), ~ g is close to gA(µ0) if µ00 is close to µ0, since the agent can at least select
A(µ00) = A(µ0). However, since gA(µ00) · gA(µ0), Vi(gA(µ00)) ¡ Ti(gA(µ00)) · Vi(~ g).
Therefore, Ti(gA(µ00)) · 0. We can infer that Ti · 0 for all µ > µ0, and hence
i 62 A(µ00). This implies that A(µ00) µ A(µ0).
Under asymmetric information, since every principal who contributes extracts
the information rent, this part of the reduction in output is larger when the less
e±cient types of agent accept more contracts. It follows that the less e±cient types
will be better o® by turning down some undesirable contracts when the reduction
in output is too serious. If this is the case, it will be optimal for some principals to
become free riders because they will then be able to enjoy a larger output and pay
less. In particular, fewer principals will want to contribute when the agent becomes
less e±cient.
5According to Proposition 2, since the agent selects an A(µ) such that gA is
maximal for every µ, the following result is immediate:
Proposition 4. Suppose in equilibrium, gA(µ) > 0 for every µ. Then:
(i) If A < N, then V 0
j(gA) > V 0
k(gA) for any j 2 A and k 62 A.
(ii) If Vj(¢) = V (¢) for all j, then A = N.
When not all principals contribute in equilibrium, it is because they have enough
heterogeneous preferences. In particular, the agent wants to contract with those who
have the highest valuations. On the other hand, if the principals have homogeneous
preferences, the agent contracts with all of the principals. This result is intriguing
because it implies that the equilibrium allocation under delegated common agency
can be very di®erent from the one under intrinsic common agency, especially when
the principals' preferences are not homogeneous, unless every principal in the society
obtains a su±ciently high marginal bene¯t from the public good compared to its
cost. Hence, it is reasonable to view intrinsic common agency as a special case since
it rarely happens in an equilibrium outcome when the number of contracts that the
agent can select is °exible.
3.3 An Example: n = 2.
Suppose that there are two principals, i;j 2 f1;2g. We denote in equilibrium
£¤¤ = fµ : A(µ) = f1;2gg, and £¤ = fµ : A(µ) = figg. We also denote the
equilibrium outputs by g¤¤ and g¤
i, which satisfy (2) respectively. Then according to
Proposition 3, there are only two possible outcomes in equilibrium: (i) £¤¤ = [µ
¹
; ¹ µ]
and £¤ = Á; (ii) £¤¤ = [µ
¹
;µ0) and £¤ = [µ0; ¹ µ], where g¤¤(µ) = g¤
i(µ) at µ0.
If the reduction in the output is large enough for types in [µ0; ¹ µ], so that g¤¤ < g¤
i,
the agent has the incentive to reject one contract, and it is also optimal for Principal
j to o®er Tj = 0 for µ > µ0, because he can save money and also enjoy a larger output,
and thus obtain a higher expected utility.
For example, suppose that Vi(g) = ki ¢ g
1
2, i = 1;2. Without loss of generality,
suppose that k1 ¸ k2. In addition, c(g) = g, and µ is distributed uniformly on [1;2].
It can be shown that µ0 =
k1¡k2
k1¡2k2 if and only if k2 < 1
3k1, where T2 = 0 in equilibrium
for all µ ¸ µ0. That is, when the preferences of the two principals are heterogeneous
enough, in equilibrium, the types in [µ0;2] contract with only one principal.
Suppose we double the number of both kinds of principals. We can show that
µ0 =
k1¡k2
k1¡1:5k2, if and only if k2 < 1
2k1, where A = f1;1;2;2g in [1;µ0), and A = f1;1g




k1¡2k2, that is, the set where all contracts are
accepted becomes smaller. We can expect that, in a large economy, it becomes rare
for the output under intrinsic common agency to be implemented in equilibrium.
64 Concluding Remarks
Under full information, the e±cient output can be implemented in a truthful equi-
librium through a common agent. When information is asymmetric, in order to
induce the agent to reveal his true type, truthful strategies are not optimal for prin-
cipals so that the equilibrium output is ine±cient. The distortion in output could be
signi¯cantly large when less e±cient types of the agent contract with all principals.
Since the agent can choose any subset of proposals, he is better o® to not accept all
contracts. In perceiving this, it is optimal for some principals to stop contributing
because they can enjoy a larger output while paying less.
It is often suggested that intrinsic and delegated common agency have no alloca-
tive di®erences when contracting activities are complements. This is true in cases
where there are no direct contractual externalities (Stole, 1991). However, this paper
shows that, when there are direct contractual externalities and asymmetric informa-
tion between principals and the agent, there is a substantial impact on allocations
under delegated common agency. This suggests that intrinsic common agency can
only be viewed as a benchmark. Further research in providing the general pro¯le
of equilibria under delegated common agency (when contracting activities can be
either complementary or substitutive) with asymmetric information would de¯nitely
be of value.
References
Bagnoli, M., and B. Lipman (1989) \Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implement-
ing the Core through Private Contributions," Review of Economic Studies 56,
583-601.
Bagnoli, M., and B. Lipman (1992) \Private Provision of Public Goods can be
E±cient," Public Choice 74, 59-78.
Bernheim, B. D., and M. Whinston (1986) \Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation,
and Economic In°uence," Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1-31.
Laussel, D., and M. Le Breton (1998) \E±cient Private Production of Public Goods
under Common Agency," Games and Economic Behavior 25, 194-218.
Martimort, D. (1992) \Multi-principaux avec Anti-selection," Annales d'Economie
et de Statistiques 28, 1-38.
Martimort, D. (1996a) \Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals
Incentive Theory," RAND Journal of Economics 27, 1-31.
Martimort, D. (1996b) \The Multiprincipal Nature of Government," European Eco-
nomic Review 40, 673-685.
7Martimort, D., and L. Stole (2003) \Contractual Externalities and Common Agency
Equilibria," Advances in Theoretical Economics 3, article 4.
Stole, L. (1991) \Mechanism Design under Common Agency," University of Chicago,
unpublished manuscript.
8